

96513-7

No. 76543-4-1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION ONE

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JOSEPH PADGETT,

Appellant,

v.

DARLA PADGETT

Respondent.

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RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW BY  
THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT

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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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**Darla Padgett**  
**Pro Se**

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**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

**UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION**

Second Amendment .....6, 12

**DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT**

*District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S.570, 635, 1285. Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) .....12

**DECISIONS OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT**

Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.wd 664, 671, 239 P.3d 557 (2010)..6, 9, 11, 12

State v. Powell, 126 Wash.2d 244,258,893 P.2d 615 (1995).....9

Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wash. 2d 500, 505,974 P.2d 316 (1999).....9

*Pers. Restraint of Duncan*, 167 Wash.2d 398, 402-03, 219 P.3d 666 (2009)).....9

Spence, 103 Wash.App. at 333, 12 P.ed 1030.....11

Barber, 136 Wash. App. at 513, 516, 150 P. 3d 124.....11

**WASHINGTON STATE STATUES**

RCW 26.50.130 (4)(2).....6, 7, 9, 11, 12

RCW 26.50.010 (3)(a).....9

**WASHINGTON COURT RULES**

CR 60(b)(6)(f).....5, 7, 8, 13

**FEDERAL STATUTES**

18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(8).....6, 12, 13

**I. IDENTITY OF RESPONDENT**

Darla K Padgett, respondent, files this Answer to the Petition for Review. She was the Plaintiff in the underlying divorce action. She has served as Pro Se throughout the divorce litigation and numerous Motions for Reconsideration, Motions to Vacate, Motion of Appeal and now, this Motion to Review.

**II. REJOINDER TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR**

1. Whether the Court should deny petitioner's request for judicial review and notice?
2. Whether the underlying, unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the denial of the CR 60(B) motion to vacate, presents an issue of substantial public interest that warrants review by this Court?
3. Whether the underlying, unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals, which found that Joseph Padgett had not appealed the underlying final judgement. Therefore, he could not legally take the appellate track, moving to vacate and appealing the denial of his motion with untimely arguments, present an issue of substantial public interest that warrants review by this Court?
4. Whether the underlying, unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals, which found that Joseph Padgett failed to follow specific Procedures for modification or termination of the permanent order of Protection by attempting to collaterally attach same order through a CR 60(b) motion to vacate, not complying with the DVPA filing

requirements, present an issue of substantial public interest that warrants review by this Court?

5. Whether the underlying, unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals, which found: that Joseph Padgett cannot meet the legal Requirements for modification or termination of the protection order under the DVPA, citing both RCW 26.50.130(4), and his inability to overcome evidence that indicates a reasonable likelihood of imminent harm in the future, given evidence presented by Darla Padgett; citing *In re Marriage of Freeman*, 169 Wn.2d 664, present an issue of substantial public interest that warrants review by this Court?

6. Whether the underlying, unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals, which found that Under 18 USC 922(g)(8), the September 2011 Restraining order, continued with the dissolution decree, remaining in effect until properly challenged through a motion to modify or terminate Under DVPA, Joseph Padgett cannot regain his right to own weapons and therefore, not having his 2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment right violated, present an issue of substantial public interest that warrants review by this Court?

7. Whether the underlying, unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals, found that the denial of the motion to vacate does not violate Joseph Padgett's right to Due Process, present an issue of substantial Public interest that warrants review by this Court?

### **III. RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENTS OF THE CASE**

Respondent relies, in part, upon the statement of facts set forth in



the unpublished Opinion issued by Division I, DARLA K. PADGETT, Respondent, v. JOSEPH PADGETT, No. 76543-4-1 (10/15/2018). The Protective Order that is under litigation, was signed by Mr. Padgett on September 26, 2011. That same restraining order was amended, making The distance Joseph Padgett needed to stay away from Respondent and their minor son, 1,000 feet. This after he was found to have recorded Darla Padgett without her knowledge or consent and attempted to use that recording with false claims of attempted murder. The commissioner listened to that tape and concluded that it was Darla Padgett that was in danger and extended the distance to 1,000 feet. That same order remained in effect, pending trial in October of 2011. It was then upheld the property distribution and parenting plan trial in August of 2014. Despite proper notification, and Joseph Padgett's confirmation, he did not Appear. The trial went on without him. Darla Padgett testified and presented evidence of Joseph's history and her reasons to continue to fear him and won her request to maintain the Protective Order of 9.26.2011. Joseph Padgett didn't appeal the original Protective Order of 9.26.2011. He did not appear at trial to challenge any of the evidence being presented. He did not enter a motion to modify or terminate, as required under DVPA, RCW 26.50.130. Instead, he violated the statutes by attempting to Collaterally attack the Protection Order through a CR 60(b) motion to vacate. The Petitioners attempt to claim that "After investigation all charges against him were dropped", is again misleading. King County evidence to prosecute. It was a Pierce County case that was decided by

the Supreme Court, that led to WA dropping the case. It was a matter of how the term “Child Pornography” is used in a search warrant. That case made the manner in which Joseph’s search warrant read, too unconstitutionally vague. It was NEVER because he was found innocent. WA Family Court goes to every extreme to preserve the relationship Between a Parent and Child. Darla Padgett won complete custody of their minor son. There was NO visitation, even under supervision, that was granted. For the petitioner to portray an innocent man and try to claim all of the commissioners and Judges that heard motions and reviewed evidence, before and after divorce, as having violated his rights and abused their discretion is absolutely false. There was evidence presented that clearly convinced all of them that Joseph Padgett should be kept away from his son and Darla Padgett. THAT is why he isn’t following procedure. He knows he would never win when evidence met his lies in ANY Court!

#### **IV. ARGUMENT**

##### **A. The Court Should Deny Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice and Review.**

Joseph Padgett improperly attempted to circumvent the statutory process for terminating the underlying protection and restraining order, when he filed the CR60(B)(6) Motion to Vacate. Him now bringing this same Motion up for Review before The WA Supreme Court, is just a further extension of his violation of the Court’s statutes. It is also part and parcel of his ongoing pattern of continually filing Motions to force Darla

Padgett to spend resources and miss work, as she has to respond. Even with a Protective Order in place, he manages to perpetuate his pattern of harassment, all while portraying his innocence. This disrespect for WA law fails to raise any issue of public interest.

B. This Court need not do a legal review of Chapter 26.50 RCW. Petitioner claims that Division I's opinion opens the door for issuance of long-term restraining orders under Chapter 26.50 RCW, in absence of any supporting finding that domestic violence has occurred. Further, he claims that Chapter 26.50 RCW creates a "GAP in the statutory scheme".

In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.wd 664, 671, 239 P.3d 557 (2010); RCW 26.50.060(2), (3); RCW 26.50.130(1). Reviewing courts should apply an abuse of discretion standard and "cannot substitute [their] judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's decision rests on unreasonable or untenable grounds." State v. Powell, 126 Wash.2d 244,258,893 P.2d 615 (1995); Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wash. 2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999). " ' A trial court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it adopts a view that no reasonable person would take.'" *Id.* at 669, 230 P.ed 583 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan*, 167 Wash.2d 398, 402-03, 219 P.3d 666 (2009)).

Pursuant to RCW 26.50.010 (3)(a)

"Domestic violence: means: (a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; The United States

Department of Justice defines domestic violence as a pattern of abusive



behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner. Domestic violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions that influence another person. Evidence of an actual physical attack is not a requirement. Darla Padgett provided a preponderance of evidence of Mr. Padgett's volatile outbursts, destruction of property, endangerment of her and her son, abandonment, deviant activities surrounding pornography, propensities to record her without her knowledge of consent, his ongoing emotional abuse and the economic hardships he perpetuated and continued to in order to destroy her financially even though she was the sole provider for their son. Claiming that Mr. Padgett never committed Domestic Violence 34 times in his Appellate Brief doesn't make it so. Judges and Commissioners have maintained the restraining order and even extended the physical space to 1,000 feet because Mr. Padgett continued his propensity to record Ms. Padgett without her knowledge or consent and then tried to use those recordings to damage her. No logical person would think that dressing someone known to be mentally ill in Darla's own wedding dress, veil and a blindfold. Then proceeding to have sex with them while pointing a gun at their head and at times putting it in their mouth, is not an act that would create fear in Darla Padgett. She produced the Polaroid pictures that JP took of himself doing it. She produced the vile pictures he created of the minor neighbor. She produced declarations from the Detective who found the vile picture Joe Padgett had created of her minor God Daughter. Mr. Padgett's actions are not just in the past. He continues causing her

stress and economic hardship by making frivolous filings full of false accusations. Now, he claims to have complied with the protective order some 9 years. Again, he avoids crossing the line just enough to avoid jail. Yet he violated her privacy and tried convincing their son to take her property without her consent or knowledge **in early 2018**. Darla, family & friends all fear him. The victim does not need to prove a new act of domestic violence if the present likelihood of recurrence is reasonable. See Spence, 103 Wash.App. at 333, 12 P.ed 1030; Barber, 136 Wash. App. at 513, 516, 150 P. 3d 124.

Consider for a moment, the lengths that WA Civil Family Court goes to, in an effort to preserve the relationship between Parent and Child. Darla Padgett presented enough evidence to have the Courts deny ANY contact between Joseph and their son. Not even with supervision. There was evidence presented alright. All Joseph Padgett does is perpetuate litigation. The truth, real evidence, laws and procedures, none of that matters to him. It is just the maintaining a fight. Wasting this Court's resources are NOT in the public's interest.

C. The Division I opinion does not conflict with this Court's Decision in Freeman.

In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d664, 674, 239 P. 3d 557 (2010)(emphasis omitted). The petitioner bears no burden of proving current reasonable fear of imminent harm by the respondent. RCW 26.50.130(3)(2). But the facts must support a finding that the petitioners fear of immanent harm is reasonable. Freeman, 169Wn. 2d at 674. "The facts supporting a protection order must reasonably relate to physical



harm, bodily injury, assault, or fear of imminent harm. It is not enough that the facts may have justified the orders in the past. Reasonable likelihood of imminent harm must be present. “Freeman, 169 Wn.2d at 674 (emphasis omitted).

Again, evidence was provided and the Court, at its’ discretion, upheld the restraining order and denied the Motion to Vacate. The Division I Opinion considered both the facts of evidence and the fact that Joseph Padgett did not follow WA laws and in failing to appeal original order. Then attempting to now raise untimely arguments. Furthermore, not following specific procedures for modification or termination of the underlying order via RCW 26.50.130 and DVPA procedures. No egregious flaw in the law that merits review for public interest. Just egregious flaw on the part of Joseph Padgett to follow the law.

D. There is no significant violation of the U.S. Constitution.

Joseph claims that there is a significant question of law under the U.W. Constitution because the restraining order amounts to a permanent ban on his right to bear arms. Yes, The Second Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d637 (2008). However, a valid restraining order does not violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Under 18 USC 922(g)(8), a person may not possess firearms or ammunition if subject to a court order that:

(A) Was issued after a hearing of which such person received Actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to Participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(k) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.

The September 2011 restraining order included a provision based on 18 USC 922(g)(8). Therefore, because a valid restraining order exists against Joseph, his right to bear arms is not violated.

E. There is no denial of Due Process

Joseph Padgett signed the restraining order in September 2011, and he did not appeal it. He failed to appear at his dissolution proceedings and, again, he did not appeal the terms of restraint and protection entered in the dissolution decree of 2014. Therefore, he was never denied Due Process.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the CR 60(F) Motion to Vacate. Their opinion outlined his lack of following WA law. He continues his 9 year pattern of abusing The Court's resources and procedures by circumventing them in his attempt to raise untimely arguments. Further, he continues to use the Court system to harass, vex and annoy Darla Padgett. As a Pro Se, Darla Padgett cannot ask for

fees. However, she does request that this Court Deny Review and sanction Joseph Padgett in an amount they deem reasonable.

Dated: December 29<sup>th</sup>, 2018

By Darla Padgett, Pro Se

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Darla K. Padgett, certify that on 31<sup>st</sup> day of December, 2018,


I caused a true and correct copy of Response To Petition For Review to

Be served on:

Sharon J. Blackford, PLLC  
600 Stewart St., Ste. 400  
Seattle, WA 98101

VIA First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid and email.

SIGNED in Sammamish, Washington, this 31<sup>st</sup> day of December, 2018.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Darla K. Padgett", is written over a horizontal line.

Darla K. Padgett  
Pro Se

# APPENDIX 1

## Court of Appeals Opinion



FILED  
COURT OF APPEALS DIV 1  
STATE OF WASHINGTON  
2018 OCT 15 AM 8:56

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DARLA K. PADGETT,

Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH PADGETT,

Appellant.

No. 76543-4-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: October 15, 2018

CHUN, J. — During the acrimonious marriage dissolution between Darla and Joseph Padgett, the court entered mutual restraining orders, including a prohibition against the possession of weapons. After the State charged Joseph<sup>1</sup> with possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the court imposed additional restraints on him. The dissolution decree, entered in August 2014, lifted the restraints as to Darla, but continued the restraints against Joseph. The court allowed Darla to keep Joseph's weapons until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The State dismissed the criminal charges on procedural grounds in December 2015.

In December 2016, Joseph filed a CR 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the restraining order and protection order provisions in the decree. He argued that the prospective application of the order was inequitable. The trial court denied

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<sup>1</sup> For convenience, this opinion refers to the parties by their first names. We mean no disrespect.

the motion to vacate and Joseph appeals. Because the CR 60(b)(6) motion to vacate was an improper attempt to circumvent the statutory process to terminate the protection and restraining orders, we affirm.

I.

BACKGROUND

Darla and Joseph married on February 6, 1998, in California. The parties separated on November 8, 2010. A superior court commissioner granted Darla's request for an ex parte temporary restraining order against Joseph. The order restrained Joseph from contact with Darla and their minor son.

On November 29, 2010, another commissioner denied entry of a full domestic violence protection order, finding "[a] preponderance of the evidence has not established that there is domestic violence." The court entered mutual restraining orders. The orders stated the parties should not have direct or indirect contact, except through counsel. A later modification of the mutual restraining order allowed for Joseph to have limited e-mail contact with Darla.

In January 2011, the State charged Joseph with one count of possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court entered an order in the criminal case prohibiting Joseph from contact with Darla and all minor children. On February 22, 2011, the court released Joseph on his own personal recognizance on the condition he not possess weapons and have no contact with Darla or any minors.

On September 26, 2011, a superior court commissioner entered a new temporary restraining order imposing mutual restraints on Joseph and Darla.

The commissioner noted a "substantial change in circumstances" since the temporary restraining order entered in November 2010: "Respondent is now charged with a crime that requires consideration of RCW 26.09.191 as to contact with a child and is in fact subject to a no contact order that prohibits contact with any child at this time." The new order restrained Joseph from coming within one thousand feet of Darla and their minor son. The order also prohibited both Darla and Joseph from disturbing the other party and possessing firearms or ammunition.

On October 10, 2011, the trial court entered a dissolution decree, but reserved resolution of the property distribution and parenting plan pending trial. The decree specified the September 26, 2011 restraining order remained in effect pending trial.

The trial on the property distribution and the parenting plan occurred on August 25, 2014. Despite proper notification, Joseph did not appear. Darla explained she wanted the restraining order maintained until resolution of the criminal case because she and their child were considered witnesses. Darla addressed the family court restraining order, which stated she was in potential danger and increased the physical scope of the restraining order against Joseph to one thousand feet. She also testified about the role Joseph played in the destruction of her business.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law and final dissolution decree entered after trial maintain many of the provisions of the September 26, 2011



restraining order. The conclusions of law state: "Mr. Padgett appeared in court and signed the restraining order entered . . . on September 26, 2011. This order and decree continues those exact same restraints on Mr. Padgett. It ends the restraints on Ms. Padgett." In the final dissolution decree, the trial court imposed additional restraints on Joseph in section 1.1 entitled "Restraining Order Summary." This section included several restrictions:

Respondent is restrained from knowingly remaining within 1000 feet of the home, work place of Darla Padgett or [their minor son] as long as he is a minor.

Respondent is restrained from going onto the grounds or entering the home, workplace, or school of Darla or [their minor son].

Joseph Padgett is restrained and enjoined from molesting, assaulting, harassing, or stalking Darla Padgett and [their minor son].

Darla may continue to store Joseph Padgett's firearms until such time as all criminal proceedings and [sic] him are terminated and he is allowed to possess firearms.

In section 3.9, entitled, "Protection Order," the trial court provided, "Joseph Padgett should not contact Darla Padgett in any way. Joseph Padgett should not contact [their minor son] in any way as long as he is a minor."

The State dismissed the criminal charges against Joseph after the court granted a motion to suppress.

In December 2016, Joseph moved under CR 60(b)(6) to vacate the restraining and protection order sections of the August 2014 dissolution decree. He argued the ambiguity and unknown duration of the terms of the restraining

order and protection order in the decree and the dismissal of the criminal charges against him made the prospective application of the orders inequitable.

At the hearing on the motion to vacate, Darla argued Joseph used the court system to abuse her by intentionally filing frivolous actions, thereby forcing her to expend time and money. Darla also raised concerns about Joseph's mental instability and his willingness to place her in danger. She told the court she was "scared to death of this man." Darla told the court:

That restraining order is the only tool that I have to protect myself. That is the only thing that's given us any peace of mind for the last years. Now my son has turned 18 . . . He's going off to college. And now this will escalate because Mr. Padgett won't be able to use him to harass me; he'll find some other way.

The court denied Joseph's motion to vacate. It maintained the prospective application of the judgment, stating, "Ms. Padgett provided evidence at the time of trial as to why it was appropriate to have such an order and that she was fearful of Mr. Padgett. She remains fearful of Mr. Padgett today, and it is equitable . . . for the order to remain in place."

Joseph appeals.

## II.

### ANALYSIS

#### A. CR 60(b)(6) Motion to Vacate

Joseph contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to vacate the protection and restraining orders. He argues the trial court erred by failing to find the prospective application of the protection and restraining orders to be inequitable. He claims the dissolution decree's language is ambiguous language



and points to the court's dismissal of all criminal charges, the early finding he had not committed domestic violence, and the lack of findings to support the restraining and protection orders. We disagree with his argument.

CR 60(b)(6) allows relief from judgment when "[t]he judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." The rule "deal[s] with problems arising under a judgment that has continuing effect, where a change in circumstances after the judgment is rendered makes it inequitable to enforce the judgment." Metro. Park Dist. of Tacoma v. Griffith, 106 Wn.2d 425, 438, 723 P.2d 1093 (1986). A vacated judgment has no effect, leaving the parties as though the judgment had never been entered. In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 618, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989).

On review of an order denying a motion to vacate, "only 'the propriety of the denial *not* the impropriety of the underlying judgment' is before the reviewing court." State v. Gaut, 111 Wn. App. 875, 881, 46 P.3d 832 (quoting Bjurstrom v. Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 450-51, 618 P.2d 533 (1980)). As a result, "an unappealed final judgment cannot be restored to an appellate track by means of moving to vacate and appealing the denial of the motion." Gaut, 111 Wn. App. at 881.

An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's decision on a motion to vacate a judgment under CR 60(b)(6) absent an abuse of discretion. Gustafson

No. 76543-4-I/7

v. Gustafson, 54 Wn. App. 66, 69-70, 772 P.2d 1031 (1989). "Discretion is abused when exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons."  
Scanlon v. Witrak, 110 Wn. App. 682, 686, 42 P.3d 447 (2002).

Here, Joseph argues the trial court failed to make the requisite finding of domestic violence necessary for a protection order under RCW 26.50.060. His argument challenges the legal justification for the original order. A CR 60(b) motion does not allow a litigant to challenge the underlying judgment. "The exclusive procedure to attack an allegedly defective judgment is by appeal from the judgment, not by appeal from a denial of a CR 60(b) motion." Biurstrom, 27 Wn. App. at 451. Therefore, any defects in the legal justification for the original order should have been addressed on appeal of that order. Because Joseph did not appeal the order, he cannot now raise these untimely arguments.

Furthermore, the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) provides specific procedures for modification or termination of a permanent order of protection. RCW 26.50.130. Under the DVPA, the respondent must make a motion to modify or terminate in order to obtain relief from a protection order's terms. RCW 26.50.130. The motion must include a declaration setting forth the facts supporting the request, which the court will deny unless the declaration establishes adequate cause for a hearing. RCW 26.50.130(2). By attempting to collaterally attack the protection order through a CR 60(b) motion to vacate, Joseph did not comply with the DVPA filing requirements for a motion to modify or terminate.

Joseph cannot meet the legal requirements for modification or termination of the protection order under the DVPA. The court may not modify a permanent protection order "unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested modification is warranted." RCW 26.50.130(4). The court may not terminate a permanent order of protection "unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial change in circumstances such that the respondent is not likely to resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or those persons protected by the protection order if the order is terminated." RCW 26.50.130(3)(a).

For termination of the protection order, "[t]he relevant analysis" includes consideration of whether the Joseph can prove "an unlikelihood of committing future acts of domestic violence and whether the facts support a current reasonable fear of imminent harm." In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d 664, 674, 239 P.3d 557 (2010) (emphasis omitted). The petitioner bears no burden of proving current reasonable fear of imminent harm by the respondent. RCW 26.50.130(3)(a). But the facts must support a finding that the petitioner's fear of imminent harm is reasonable. Freeman, 169 Wn.2d at 674. "The facts supporting a protection order must reasonably relate to physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the fear of imminent harm. It is not enough that the facts may have justified the order in the past. Reasonable likelihood of imminent harm must be in the present." Freeman, 169 Wn.2d at 674 (emphasis omitted).



The record does not support Joseph's claim that Darla's fear stems from conduct related to the dismissed criminal charges. Darla testified about her fear of Joseph and his ongoing attempts to harass her. The trial court's oral ruling reflected its consideration of the standards for termination of a restraining order. The court found Darla had demonstrated her continuing fear. This finding resulted in the denial of the motion to vacate and maintenance of the restraining order. Given the evidence presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by retaining the provisions of the restraining order.

Because Joseph attempts to collaterally attack the legal basis for the original restraining and protection orders and to circumvent the termination requirements stipulated by the DVPA, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate.

B. Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms

Joseph contends the trial court's failure to vacate the restraining order infringes on his Second Amendment Right to bear arms. Specifically, he asserts that, because there is no pending criminal charge or evidence of domestic violence, the public-interest justification for restraining him from bearing arms is absent. He argues the restraining order amounts to a permanent ban on his right to bear arms.

The Second Amendment "elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home."

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d

637 (2008). A valid restraining order does not violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Under 18 USC 922(g)(8), a person may not possess firearms or ammunition if subject to a court order that:

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.

The September 2011 restraining order included a provision based on 18 USC 922(g)(8), "[e]ffective immediately and continuing as long as this restraining order is in effect, the restrained person may not possess a firearm or ammunition."

The dissolution decree continued this restraint. As discussed, the protection and restraining orders remain in effect until properly challenged through a motion to modify or terminate under the DVPA. Joseph cannot regain his right to own weapons by evading this procedure through a motion to vacate. Because a valid restraining order exists against Joseph, his right to bear arms is not violated.

#### C. Due Process

Joseph also argues denial of the motion to vacate violates due process because the orders are too vague and inadequate to give notice of prohibited conduct. But Joseph signed the restraining order in September 2011, and he did not appeal it. He failed to appear at his dissolution proceedings and, again, he



No. 76543-4-I/11

did not appeal the terms of restraint and protection entered in the dissolution decree in 2014.

We affirm the denial of the CR 60(b) motion to vacate.

Chen, J.

WE CONCUR:

Schubert, J.

Appelvik, CJ.

# DARLA PADGETT - FILING PRO SE

December 31, 2018 - 2:49 PM

## Transmittal Information

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**Appellate Court Case Number:** 76543-4  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** Darla Padgett, Respondent v. Joseph Padgett, Appellant  
**Superior Court Case Number:** 10-3-07978-9

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